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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate concerning the compatibility of
variable pay schemes (VPS) and trade unions, by investigating the effects of the managerial function
(to increase management control over employees) and market function (to attract and retain suitably
qualified employees) of VPS for trade unions.
Design/methodology/approach – A critical case study approach was used to verify how the two
varying functions of VPS affect the trade union of a large multi-establishment Irish financial
institution. Data are based on a total of 60 in-depth interviews with key informants (trade unions,
managers and non-managerial employees) at various levels in the organisational hierarchy and a
representative survey of employees.
Findings – While the findings confirmed the a priori expectation that the managerial function of VPS
is more likely to damage unions than the market function, this study revealed that the interplay
between the two functions varied over time and across outlets, and was primarily contingent on the
disposition of line management towards the use of VPS and the market context.
Research limitations/implications – The consequences of the shift to a managerial function of
VPS following the 2008 economic crisis could only be assessed in a preliminary manner due to the time
frame of the study.
Practical implications – Trade unions, managers and employees need to consider the potential gaps
between the intended purposes of VPS and their actual implementation to assess whether they are of
potential benefit.
Originality/value – This paper contributes to the existing literature in two main ways. First, it adds
that the market function of VPS serves managers’ aims not only in aiding them attract, retain and
motivate suitably qualified employees as indicated by Flanders (1970), but also in helping them gain
great control over labour costs, which in turn, has mixed effects for trade unions. Second, in addition to
the pragmatic reasons identified by previous studies, the findings show that a key determinant in
unions’ acceptance of VPS involves earlier experiences of unions fighting unsuccessfully against the
adoption of VPS.
Keywords Line managers, Banks, Pay policies, Trade unions
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
The relationship between variable pay schemes (VPS) and trade union workplace
controls has a long lineage in work and employment relations scholarship (Edwards and
Scullion, 1982; Flanders, 1970; Roy, 1952). In the early literature, it was widely believed
that VPS represented a significant threat to trade unions, as they were often used
intentionally to undermine unions and increase managerial control (Flanders, 1970;
Gunnigle et al., 1998). These studies found that VPS damage unions, principally through
the erosion of workers’ collective identity and commitment to unions (Kessler and Purcell,
1992). More recent empirical studies reveal that VPS may not damage unions in
every circumstance (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2011; Nergaard and Dolvik, 2012).
These studies point to situations where unions are able to maintain collective control over
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certain aspects of variable pay regulation, when there is no deliberate management
intention to undermine trade unions. The outcomes for unions are thus perceived to be
contingent on the purpose of the VPS.
Although Flanders (1970) distinguished between two main purposes of VPS, these
being a managerial function (i.e. to increase management control over employees) and a
market function (i.e. to attract and retain suitably qualified employees), there is limited
empirical evidence on the actual impact of the two different functions of VPS on trade
unions. The available evidence would indicate that those forms of VPS which are
introduced to enhance management’s control over the labour process are more likely to
challenge union controls and thereby undermine their influence than those which are
designed to serve a market function (Heery, 1997b; Gunnigle et al., 1998). Nevertheless,
there are mixed outcomes for unions even when there is no deliberate managerial
intention to use VPS to marginalise unions (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2011; Heery,
1997b; Nergaard and Dolvik, 2012). Thus it would seem that the marginalisation unions
may result despite the intention of managers. Still, however, given the dearth of
research evidence in the field (Marginson et al., 2008), it remains unclear exactly how
VPS’ effect union influence (whatever its design or intention).
This paper addresses this gap in the literature by investigating the effects of the
managerial and market functions of VPS on trade unions in the case of a large Irish
financial services company. This highly unionised organisation is identified as a
critical case, as it introduced a particular form of VPS for outlet managers in the late
1980s, with the purpose of enhancing the headquarters’ managerial control over
management working in the bank’s retail outlets. Then in the 2000s, the company
introduced another form of VPS for the non-managerial employees and junior
managers working in the retail outlets with the objective of performing primarily a
market function. The implementation of this VPS was dependent on how outlet
managers introduced and operated the scheme. Thus as the case company is a large
multi-establishment company, it is possible for us to explore the extent to which the
declared purpose of VPS is adhered to by managers in the different outlets. This case
study therefore provides a rather unique setting to explore how the two varying
functions of VPS affected trade unions.
While the overall findings confirmed the a priori expectation that the managerial
function of VPS is more likely to damage unions than the market function, this paper
contributes to the existing literature in three further ways. First, it finds that the market
function of VPS serves managers’ aims not only in aiding them to attract, to retain and
to motivate suitably qualified employees, as indicated by Flanders (1970), but also in
helping them gain greater control over labour costs, which in turn, had mixed effects
for trade unions (some positive, some negative consequences). Whichever outcome
occurred was found to be contingent on the role of the outlets’ (line) managers and the
function they identified that the VPS could serve. Second, the distinction drawn by
Flanders between the two managerial objectives for VPS – that is, of serving a
“market” and “control” functions – is found to be of limited analytical value in that the
two were sometimes entangled within one another. Further, while they were sometimes
found to be complimentary, other times they were found to be conflictual. Third, the
paper contributes to the literature by explaining why unions have come to accept VPS
in recent years. In addition to the pragmatic reasons identified by previous studies
(Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2011; Marginson et al., 2008; Heery, 1997a), our findings
show that a key determinant in unions acceptance of VPS involves earlier experiences
of unions fighting unsuccessfully against the adoption of VPS.
2
The purpose
of VPS and
trade unions
The paper begins by reviewing the consequences of VPS’ managerial and market
functions on trade unions. It then explains the study’s research design, and thereafter
presents and discusses the empirical findings.
Literature review
It is generally accepted that unions prefer standardised mechanisms of payment based
on principles of the common rule and rate-for-the-job (Bryson et al., 2011; Eurofound,
2015). If differences in pay levels are allowed, unions tend to prefer that they would
arise from a system which recognises employees’ length-of-service or from some form
of payment-by-results scheme which takes account of employees’ productivity as
assessed on the basis of “hard” quantitative measures (Marsden and Belfield, 2010).
Such mechanisms have a dual benefit for unions: they are easy to govern and police
and they unite workers around common interests – a pay rise for one is a pay rise for
all. For workers, they ensure predictability of earnings.
Union fears with new forms of VPS usually centre on the purpose of the VPS
(Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2011; Gunnigle et al., 1998); that is, whether they are
intended to increase management control over employees (managerial function) or to
attract and retain suitably qualified employees (market function) (Flanders, 1970). Kessler
(2000) has made the case that the recent popularity of individual performance-related
pay (IPRP) cannot be explained by the traditional managerial aims of enhancing
employee recruitment, retention and motivation (market function) alone. Instead it is also
being used to signal a very different approach to management: that managers must
manage, and without the interference of a union (managerial function). The market
function of VPS can be used by managers in two divergent ways to deal with increased
market competition; they may be used to provide additional (performance-related) pay to
attract, retain and motivate employees to work harder and develop long-term trust
relations with customers, whilst they may also be used to reduce labour costs as found,
for example, by Regini et al. (1999) in their seminal account of the changing nature of
work in retail banking.
Although VPS may have mixed purposes (Marginson et al., 2008), the prevalence of
a market or managerial function is generally reflected in the different VPS forms
(Heery, 1997a; Marginson et al., 2008), processes of adoption and implementation
(Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2011; Gunnigle et al., 1998) and outcomes (Kessler, 2000;
Traxler et al., 2008). This section reviews the consequences of VPS’ managerial and
market functions on trade unions in relation to these three inter-related elements.
Forms of VPS and their effects on trade unions
It is common place to distinguish between three different forms of VPS (Van het Kaar and
Grünell, 2001): (a) IPRP schemes that reward employees on the basis of a superior’s
appraisal of their work performance; (b) incentive-based schemes that establish a link
between pay and employees’ output (examples include piecework, payment-by-results,
commission and bonuses); and (c) organisation-wide schemes, such as profit-sharing and
equity-share plans, that reward employees on the basis of the organisation’s
performance. As the organisation-based VPS do not distinguish between employees’
effort levels, they often account for only a modest proportion of employees’ earnings and
are paid generally to all on top of their salary. Due to this they are rarely identified as a
significant threat to unions (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2011). They are also the least
commonly used (Eurofound, 2015). Comparatively IPRP is considerably more common
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and form (a) is prevalent in 43 per cent of establishments, while incentive-based schemes
that establish a link between pay and employees’ output (form b) are used in 34 per cent
of establishments operating in the EU (Eurofound, 2015, p. 75).
In establishing an explicit link between individual employees’ effort levels and the
rewards they receive, both forms (a and b) of IPRP provide management with an
effective “cost control” mechanism (Kessler and Purcell, 1992). It has also been found
that IPRP led to substantial erosion in unions’ influence over pay determination as well
as weakening the union’s relationship with its members and, in some cases, led to
de-recognition (Heery, 1997a, 2000). Further, as IPRP is often designed to increase
employees’ productivity by stimulating competition between employees, it generates
differences in pay levels across workers undertaking broadly comparable tasks (Heery,
2000; Marginson et al., 2008). IPRP can therefore make it difficult for unions to sustain a
collective identity around pay determination and, in turn, to mobilise members around
shared interests (Marginson et al., 2008; Heery, 2000; Wood, 1996).
Overall, the effect of different forms of VPS on trade unions varies, depending on
their focus on managerial and/or market function of VPS. The most widely used IPRP
scheme, form (a), which is specifically designed to increase management’s prerogative,
represents the biggest threat to unions (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2011), followed by
IPRP schemes that have both a managerial function and a market function (form b).
Finally, the organisation-wide schemes introduced to attract and retain suitably
qualified employees (market function) are the least likely to affect trade unions.
Nevertheless, 65 per cent of those establishments using VPS have two or more forms in
place (Eurofound, 2015, p. 75), which makes it unclear as to how these various VPS
schemes operating in tandem actually affect unions.
Introduction and implementation of VPS and their effects on trade unions
The process of introduction and implementation of VPS in unionised workplaces vary
from a deliberate strategy of marginalising unions to involving them and engaging in joint
decision processes (Marsden and Belfield, 2010; Traxler et al., 2008). In Ireland, Gunnigle
et al. (1998, p. 565) argued that the diffusion of VPS was “indicative of increasing employer
attempts to individualise the employment relationship and exclude union penetration”.
In their study of the introduction of VPS in multinational corporations, they found that
employers used the introduction of IPRP to signal the adoption of an individualist
orientation to staff relations that excludes or severely restricts trade union involvement. In
a later study, they found that many managers used the 2008 recession as an opportunity
to substantially reduce labour costs by paying lower or no bonuses, and by dispensing
with profit-sharing schemes, particularly in the banking sector where the power of unions
was significantly diminished (Gunnigle et al., 2013, p. 222). Roche and Teague’s (2014,
p. 179) findings are a little different. While they too found that Irish companies took a
series of measures to reduce their overall payroll costs, this was not accompanied by
a systematic attempt to marginalise unions. VPS was in fact one of the key aspects on
which employers consulted unions during the crisis in the EU (Eurofound, 2015, p. 10).
While it might be the case that management is motivated to adopt IPRP by a desire
to enhance their control over the labour process, this may not extend to a deliberate
strategy of marginalising unions. Management may be well aware of the many
problems associated with VPS and, in an attempt to allay workers’ fears, may seek to
tie their own hands by inviting union representatives to become involved in talks
to arrive at a negotiated agreement (Marsden and Belfield, 2010; Traxler et al., 2008).
Such union involvement might include the negotiation of the size of the overall pay
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award, the revalorisation of grade point minima and maxima and the criteria for
variable pay’s distribution, although management may retain the authority to decide
on how to distribute pay increases according to individual performance (Arrowsmith
and Marginson, 2011; Heery, 2000). Roche and Teague (2014, p. 179) found that the HR
changes introduced in unionised companies worked best for firms with union
involvement in decision making, due to the manner in which joint decision making was
perceived to enhance the fairness of management actions.
Unions might also see some benefit to working with management in introducing VPS.
Unions might be inclined to accept VPS, where there is a tradition of jointly addressing
workplace change (Dalton, 1998). The available evidence also suggests that unions’
acceptance of VPS may be informed by a variety of other considerations. These include
recognition of management’s rationale and by a desire to meet employees’ expectations of
increased pay which may include an acceptance of a meritocratic pay scheme which – if
properly and fairly administered – differentiates on the basis of employees’ efforts and
performance. Consider the findings of Marginson et al. (2008, p. 342) where,
notwithstanding unions’ rhetorical distaste for IPRP in the two sectors studied – retail
banking and machinery and equipment – unions were found to be pragmatic in their
response. Where IPRP was introduced with “objective” criteria of assessment and could
be shown to add to employees’ earnings and to help in maintaining the viability of the
enterprise, unions were accommodating. The Eurofound (2013) study, too, found that in
the large majority of EU countries (including Ireland) employee representatives are more
likely to be supportive than obstructive to the introduction of VPS. Nevertheless, unions
are more likely to become involved in the process of adoption and implementation if the
VPS is used to serve a market function, as it may provide them with an opportunity to
maintain (or expand) their role at the workplace.
However, there could be unintended downstream consequences of VPS where the
threat to unions is not apparent in the schemes’ design or introduction but rather only
becomes evident from their operation on the ground. For example, a situation where
some workers may welcome VPS as a means for enhancing their earnings, while others
may object fearing that it will import risk and uncertainty, it is challenging here for
unions to preserve workers’ collective identity and commitment to trade unions
(Marginson et al., 2008; Heery, 2000; Wood, 1996). Thus, the consequences of VPS for
unions are uncertain, even when there is no deliberate intention to marginalise unions.
The outcomes of VPS and their effects on trade unions
Unions’ previous experience of the perceived gap between the expected and the actual
outcomes of VPS has resulted in an attempt to be further involved with their
introduction in the workplace (Kessler, 2000). Particular unintended consequences have
often been identified by unions and include: demoralisation of staff arising from biased
and inconsistent assessments; undermining teamwork; and fostering rivalry between
workers (Kessler, 2000; Prendergast, 2010; Storey and Sisson, 1993). It has also been
found that in circumstances where VPS gives rise to anomalous outcomes or perceived
inequities, they are likely to become a potent source of grievance and conflict for and
amongst employees. This, in turn, may provide unions with a point of leverage over
management, thereby enhancing their regard among union members.
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence suggests that the existence of perceived
inequities need not necessarily lead employees to request a greater role for their
union. Heery’s (1997b) national survey of union officers and case study of union
representatives in local government and local authorities in the UK indicates that, while
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there was evidence that IPRP had stimulated demand among members for a greater
union role to ensure that it was fairly implemented, thereafter unions were rarely, if
ever, called upon to address workers’ grievances with the operation of the VPS. Heery’s
research points to the importance of the level of union organisation within the
workplace and unions’ ability to give coherent expression to workers’ concerns to
temper the potentially corrosive effects of VPS. Hence, it is conceivable that a strong
trade union may benefit from the introduction of IPRP where it is associated with an
escalation in individual grievances, but a weak union may not. Thus, there could be
unintended positive consequences for strong, well-organised unions, particularly when
VPS is introduced to serve a managerial function.
In summary, the effects of VPS on trade unions are not clear-cut, whether they are
introduced to serve a managerial or a market function. On the one hand, it might be
claimed that when a variable payment scheme is used to perform primarily a
managerial function, its effects might be perceived to be damaging to unions (Gunnigle
et al., 1998). However, that is far from certain. The use of IPRP, for example, which is
based on a superior’s appraisal of an employees’ performance and which excludes
unions from its adoption and implementation may lead to perceived inequities.
Employees, in turn, may seek a greater role for trade unions to address their
grievances. Similarly when a VPS is used to serve a market function, its consequences
for unions cannot be assumed a priori to be benign. Some studies, for example, indicate
that VPS does not necessarily damage unions when variable rewards are paid on top of
existing wages, and where strong unions have been involved in the introduction and
implementation process (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2011; Heery, 1997b; Traxler et al.,
2008). Furthermore, there are very few studies examining the actual consequences of
VPS for trade unions, particularly in the private sector (Marginson et al., 2008) and
especially where VPS of variable elements and purposes are introduced. The case study
examined in this paper thus presents a rare opportunity to investigate the effects of the
managerial and the market functions of VPS on trade unions.
Methodology
We examine a case of the introduction and operation of VPS in a highly unionised
financial services company in Ireland (anonymised as BankCo). We combined sequential
exploratory and explanatory research designs (Creswell et al., 2003). First,
14 key informants were interviewed in 2006 and 2007, to help us develop quantitative
measures. This included three interviews with senior officers of the Irish Bank Officials’
Association (IBOA), two shop stewards, four interviews with management with
responsibility for industrial relations and human resources management at company
level, two regional HRmanagers and three workplace managers[1]. All had been involved
at various stages in the design and implementation of the VPS. Subsequently, we
undertook a postal survey of the company’s retail staff in July 2007. A proportionate
probability stratified sampling procedure was used to examine the views of 851
employees of whom 66 were categorised as senior managers, 213 as junior managers and
the remaining 572 as non-managerial employees. The response rate, which was 54 per
cent overall, varied across the three occupational groups: 79 per cent for senior
management, 64 per cent for junior management and 48 per cent for non-managerial
employees. To adjust for these differences in response rates, the response sample was
weighted to restore the number of respondents to their correct respective proportions in
the workforce. The present study is confined to examining union members, of which
there were 523 (or 78 per cent of the weighted response sample).
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Second, we used a sequential explanatory design (Creswell et al., 2003), by
conducting 45 in-depth interviews in nine retail outlets in 2008 to assist us in explaining
and interpreting the survey findings. The outlets were selected to represent a broad
representation of geographical spread and size. In each outlet, we interviewed the
manager, the workplace union representative together with at least one junior manager
and, one senior and one recently recruited employee. Each interview lasted between
35 and 45 minutes. There was a thematic content analysis of the qualitative data.
Findings
This section examines the effects of the VPS purpose on BankCo’s trade union (IBOA)
in relation to its forms, process of introduction and implementation and the perceived
outcomes for employees following the introduction of VPS. This is followed by an
analysis of the overall consequences for the union’s presence, cohesion and influence.
Forms of VPS and their effects on trade union
In the late 1980s, BankCo introduced IPRP for retail outlet managers and in the
mid-2000s introduced individual and collective forms of VPS for junior managers and
non-managerial staff. With respect to the former, VPS was designed to help the company
reassert control over workplace managers many of whomwere in union membership and
along with this to reduce the union’s capacity to resist changes in work practices. Prior to
then, managers’ pay increases (and non-managerial staff) were negotiated by the IBOA at
an industry level. In moving towards VPS, BankCo provided a very attractive package
for outlet managers that included an initial pay increase in excess of the provisions of the
collective agreement and a company car scheme in exchange for agreeing to individual
contracts of employment. According to a senior trade union official:
It was totally voluntary. There would be new ranges put in place and based on how individual
managers perform. […] Managers had two weeks to respond and the vast majority
of managers opted in. […] The bank took the view here would be an opportunity to take
the managers out of the trade union without saying that that was the reason. Number two,
providing a better benchmark to manage the managers, because at that point in time most
managers had a kind of a self-contained little branch with their own manager.
The senior managers interviewed confirmed that they were compelled to find ways to
reduce the union’s influence at that time as, it was claimed, the union opposed all
technological changes which rendered BankCo less competitive than its main
competitors. Despite the IBOA’s resistance and their advice to outlet management to
reject the new pay scheme, it was introduced unilaterally. The great bulk of
management left the union and the IBOA lost the right – and the capacity – to negotiate
the salaries of the outlet managers. Thus, although IPRP was paid on top of these
employees’ exiting salaries, the VPS damaged the status and position of the union with
regard to this cohort of the bank’s staff. In this instance, VPS was introduced to serve a
managerial function.
In 2006, BankCo introduced a profit-sharing scheme and a new performance
management system (including IPRP) combined with a re-definition of employees’ job
roles and responsibilities, which entailed redirecting staff’s efforts from “telling”
(advising customers) to “selling” (prevailing upon customers of the merits of buying a
particular financial product).
This resembles, in some respects, the changes “from tellers to sellers” identified by
Regini et al. (1999, p. 10), which refers to a shift in job roles from processing transactions
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towards a sales and service orientation. BankCo, however, first improved its services
following technological changes in the 1990s, and only in the mid-2000s, did management
seek to persuade employees to see any customer interaction as a “sales opportunity”.
The company’s decision to implement the new VPS was informed by two economic
objectives which might broadly be said to embrace Flanders’ “market” and “managerial”
functions. The emphasis, however, varied across different managerial functions.
HR management placed a great deal of emphasis on the requirement, as in the early- to
mid-2000s, to attract and retain talented employees. Staff had also indicated to
management, principally through annual staff surveys that the standardised incremental
pay scale system failed to recognise and reward employees’ for their efforts and that VPS
would be welcome.
Business managers, however, placed more emphasis on the managerial function of
the VPS and, in particular, the requirement to enhance their control over the labour
process. This was cast as a requirement to strengthen the company’s performance
culture with the expressed intention to enhance work organisation processes by better
planning “what” needs to be done and “how” it should be done. They also wanted to be
in a position to compare the performance levels of staff across retail units and to
identify and share “best practice”. It was also expected that the regular interaction
between management and employees at appraisal time would provide for greater
accountability, as well as helping to identify employees’ training needs. While senior
HR personnel understood the need to develop both functions of the VPS – market and
managerial – their task, as they saw it, was to balance these potentially competing
objectives, particularly at the outset of VPS’ introduction, so as to ensure that both the
staff and union bought-in to its operation. For this reason, the former more benign
function was given greater weight in the roll-out of the initiative than the latter
potentially harsher managerial function.
Under the new VPS, employees’ pay comprised of three elements. First, there was a
“pay zone” for each occupational grade which ranged from “entry”, “mid” to
“advanced”. For example, officials’ pay zones ranged from €21,637 to €28,890 at the
entry zone, €28,891to €37,499 at the mid zone and €37,500 to €41,700 at the advanced
zone. Second, with the IPRP scheme payments ranged from 0 (where an employee fails
to meet expectations) to 7 per cent (consistently exceeds expectations) at the entry
zone, from 0 to 5.5 per cent at the mid zone and from 0 to 3 per cent at the advanced
zone. Finally, a profit-sharing bonus based on the company’s financial performance
was paid to all employees, assuming their performance was deemed to have met
expectations. Individual bonuses, expressed as a percentage of base salary, ranged
from 2.7 per cent to 13.3 per cent for officials, up to 16 per cent for officers and up to 20
per cent for junior managers. In 2006, employees with a minimum period of one year
service were paid a 5 per cent share of the company’s profits of €1.7 billion in bonus
payments, which were received either in shares or in cash.
Introduction and implementation of VPS and their effects on trade union
In contrast to the unilateral introduction of VPS for management in the late 1980s,
when BankCo introduced VPS for its other retail outlet staff in the 2000s it granted the
IBOA a significant level of influence over its design and implementation. It did so for
one principle reason, it expected stern union resistance if it had acted unilaterally.
It had learned an unpleasant lesson in the early 1990s when, in an attempt to introduce
new technologies and new work practices, there was a bitter and prolonged industrial
dispute, culminating in a four-month strike.
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The experience of resisting the introduction of the VPS in the 1980s also affected the
union’s stance. Although the IBOA was ideologically opposed to the introduction of
IPRP, it saw little practical benefit in resisting management. First, if they had objected,
they believed “they would have been wiped off the pitch”. Second, the IBOA had long
been a vehement opponent of centralised multi-employer bargaining which had operated
in Ireland with the advent of social partnership in 1987. The strictures associated with
these national-level agreements had restrained wage growth in profitable sectors and had
made little and infrequent provision for additional company-level bargaining. The IBOA
foresaw the possibility that, if in negotiations with the company, it was able to ensure
that the VPS payments were made on top of annual cost-of-living increases and were
determined by productivity improvements, the union might be provided with a legitimate
means for increasing the wages of its members above that prescribed in the national
wage agreements. Also, as the economic circumstances of the national economy were
buoyant and as the financial outlook for the company was propitious, the union took the
pragmatic view that the company’s profits should be shared with staff. Finally, a survey
of union members conducted by the IBOA indicated that the vast majority of members
were in favour of VPS. The union was therefore, from an early stage, positively disposed
towards accepting the introduction of VPS.
It took two years to reach an agreement. The company set out to introduce the VPS
together with a plan to reconstitute employees’ work roles, responsibilities and
competencies. The IBOA sought to ensure that any new appraisal-based pay system
would be fair, equitable and would operate in a transparent manner; that employee
participation therein would be voluntary; that its representatives would negotiate
annual profit-sharing bonus payments and that participation would be open to all staff;
and finally, that any new job roles would be specified by agreement. In the final stage of
negotiations, the two parties agreed to use the services of the Labour Relations
Commission to help them in resolving outstanding differences. Their recommendation
provided for a 2.5 per cent pensionable wage increase for all staff, as well as a
15 per cent and a 7.5 per cent increase in the salary scales of junior staff and managerial
grades up to assistant manager, respectively. The recommendation also included the
introduction of a voluntary IPRP system and a profit-sharing scheme. The size of
the latter’s payment was to be negotiated annually with the trade union. Cost-of-living
increases agreed under the terms of national wage agreements would continue to be
applied automatically. The recommendation was balloted upon and the majority of
employees voted in favour.
All parties expressed satisfaction with the negotiated outcome. Management
believed the VPS permitted them greater control over the organisation of work
(managerial function), while allowing them to reward excellent staff and to reduce
employee turnover (market function). The union judged it had exercised a great deal of
influence in the negotiations. The VPS was seen to be fair, particularly as participation
therein and the setting of performance targets was voluntary (for existing employees),
and staff retained the option of opting-out in the first two years. It also included an
appeal procedure, which permitted employees to be accompanied and represented by
their union representative or by a work colleague. The union was particularly pleased
that all VPS payments were to be paid on top of cost-of-living increases. In this sense,
the VPS not only represented a very significant “local bargaining” gain, but its design
and the manner of its operation, “ensured”, as one senior union officer argued, that “the
IBOA remained relevant”. Thus, at the design and introduction stage of the VPS,
the trade union had played an important and constructive role.
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The outcomes of VPS and their effects on trade unions
The results from the employee survey and in-depth interviews in the nine selected
workplaces indicated that employees were broadly happy with their wages and the
bonuses they received under the VPS. Most respondents’ views were positive:
“There are only upsides to it, especially for younger staff” (outlet manager, March
2008). “My salary increased by €3,360 in 2006”; “it gives people a chance to perform and
progress in their career” (interviews with junior managers, May 2008). “It is a fair
reflection of how people perform. It is an incentive for young people to work harder”;
“it’s not brilliant, but up to now there was nothing” (interviews with non-managerial
employees, April 2008). The findings from the survey and the interviewees reflect both
the buoyant economic circumstances and the manner in which their performance was
appraised and the amounts of extra payment they received.
There are two points which warrant emphasis. First, the variable payments made to
staff were paid on top of their existing wage and in addition to the pay increases
awarded under social partnership. Second, senior management tempered the
independent influence of line management by urging workplace managers to be
generous in their evaluation of employees’ performance in the first two years of the
scheme. This resulted in the payment of sizeable bonus payments as indicated in
the quotations above. One junior manager explained that “the policy was to give almost
everybody a ‘fully meets expectations’ grade in the first two years”, while a
non-managerial employee believed that “the first year was too good to be true”.
At the time we conducted our in-depth interviews in the nine selected workplaces, the
market circumstances of the banking industry had changed very markedly. The
economic crisis had now taken hold. The findings as to the effects of VPS on workers and
their work at this point relay a more complex and variable picture. The VPS had been in
place for three or more years and the limitations formerly placed on line management
discretion in determining employees’ variable payments had been lifted. There was now
greater scope for workplace managers to use the VPS as they deemed appropriate.
In four of the workplaces we examined the VPS was associated with increased
workloads, increased rivalry between staff, impaired teamwork and poor morale. We
wondered initially whether these outcomes were directly attributable to the VPS, and that
perhaps we had failed to capture the full effects of the introduction of VPS in our survey
instrument administered some time earlier, or whether the altered economic context was
the key factor. Neither, however, accounted fully for these findings. Certainly while the
worsening economic context was identified by staff to be important, they emphasised
other influences, in particular the role and “style” of local management. These various
factors are illustrated in the views expressed by employees below:
At first it [the VPS] seemed like a good thing. You had a definite career trajectory. The goals
seemed attainable in a buoyant economy. But now the targets are less attainable and there
will be repercussions for staff. […] Targets are a lot higher and the current economic situation
makes them harder to reach (non-managerial employee, 2008).
It’s more about profits than people. It’s all about the results. As soon as you do well, they ask
you to do more; and […] yes, you get recognition, but they expect too much from us
(non-managerial employee, 2008).
Increased competition and the new VPS have led to increased workload, stress; staff are
stretched over their limits. There were conflicts between reviewers and reviewees.
The assessment “fell short” of a junior manager last year led to conflict and divisions within
the management team (outlet manager, 2008).
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In one of these four workplaces, the following comments were made by staff:
This workplace is a dictatorship (non-managerial employee “a”, 2008).
There’s no team spirit here (non-managerial employee “b”, 2008).
Employees stole customers from each other. It’s a cut-throat environment (non-managerial
employee “c”, 2008).
Significantly, however, in the other five workplaces and despite the similarly changed
market circumstances, the outcomes for staff were very different. Here they pointed to
the benefits of the VPS. As to the reasons, employees gave emphasis to the same set of
contingencies identified in the other four workplaces; that is, the quality of local
management and the climate of staff-management relations, but these were seen
to operate in a different manner. Interviewees emphasised, for example, that the VPS
operated in a more objective manner than the former payment system:
It adds structure and it’s clear what you need to do to progress in your career ( junior
manager, 2008).
It helps to focus on objectives and there’s regular communication and feedback (non-managerial
employee, 2008).
We struggle to explain the presence of different management styles. First, we examined
whether they might be related to the outlet performance, but this was not the case.
Second, we investigated whether gender affects it, as three (out the five) outlets with
predominately positive effects on staff had female managers, while the other four had
male managers. However, survey data show no significant gender differences in 2007.
Nevertheless, it might be the case that during the recession female managers were more
likely than their male counterparts to maintain good relationships with workers.
Overall, it appears that the management style was primarily dependent on the personal
approach to management of outlet managers.
As to the consequences for the union, at first we examined how the IBOA responded
to these adverse consequences and then how members viewed the union’s response.
In in-depth interviews with the IBOA, senior union officers acknowledged the varied
consequences of VPS across business outlets, while also pointing to various measures
which were introduced to mitigate their effects:
We cannot control how this will be played out in each outlet. It has posed big challenges for
us. But we request and are given the distribution curve each year. This is a broad controlling
mechanism as we also have the distribution for pay before 2004.
Technically we had a good agreement, but for it to work people had to appeal their rating, but
people saw it as inevitable, because if they challenged it they feared they would be relocated.
Agreeing targets was to be voluntary in theory but in practice it was less so. Local managers
were working outside the agreement.
In the four workplaces where there were negative effects on staff we enquired how they
assessed the union’s response. In interviews with staff they did not identify the IBOA as
being culpable; they did in fact believe that the union had made a commendable effort to
protect their interests in difficult circumstances. Most workers identified the financial crisis,
executive management’s part therein, and the role of line management as the principal
reasons for the difficulties they experienced with the VPS. As such, the employees did not
“blame” the union for the harsher side-effects of the VPS and they understood and accepted
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the appropriateness of the union’s shifting postures as they moved from securing
additional benefits for staff (market pay context) in the mid-2000s, to adopting a defensive
position (managerial pay context) as the economic circumstances of the firm changed in the
late 2000s. They further conceded that the former objective had been requested by staff
themselves – they had sought higher wage increases than that permitted under national
wage agreements and VPS were the vehicle for achieving such gains. While many staff
foresaw that it would now be more difficult to achieve new bonuses in the harsher climate
of the late 2000s, they appreciated the new role which the union could offer principally in
affording them some protection against work intensification and bullying by line
management. Such traditional union roles came to be more important post 2007/2008 than
they had been during the earlier economic boom years.
In summary, it is clear that that the variability in outcomes witnessed across the nine
workplaces cannot be attributed solely to the financial crisis or to the shift in managerial
strategy. At the outset, management’s strategy for VPS combined both market and
managerial functions. In the first two years of the initiative the focus was on the former;
times were good, the company was anxious to embed the new reward scheme and workers
received generous bonus payments. However, as the consequences of the economic crisis
became more apparent senior management strategy flipped from the former more benign
motivation to accentuating the latter managerial function. Still, the potentially harsher
side-effects of this shift were mediated by local management style. For some managers the
appropriate strategy was to give renewed emphasis to the market function of VPS
and through such means they would be able to maintain employees’ cooperation. Others
emphasised the managerial function of the scheme, however, which was perceived by
employees to be crude and led to the intensification of staff effort levels. Despite this, the
union was not faulted for its participation in the introduction of the VPS, although there
was acknowledgement that it was stretched in its oversight of their effects as the recession
intensified. Apart from this, there were no major negative spill-over repercussions for the
IBOA, as is also indicated by the quantitative data which we review below.
Overall downstream consequences of VSP on trade union
Union presence. In contrast to the introduction of IPRP for senior managers in the late
1980s, where the IBOA lost the right to represent this category of staff, the adoption of
VPS in the mid-2000s for junior managers and non-managerial staff was accompanied, as
we have seen above, by the extensive involvement of the IBOA. Subsequent to its
introduction, the evidence suggests that the consequences for the union remained
relatively benign, although there were some tensions and perceived failings. Trade union
density remained high (78 per cent) and had not declined with the introduction of VPS.
Union cohesion. While there were major tensions between members and the union after
expelling members who crossed the pickets during the 1992 strike, the union remained a
cohesive force through the mid to late 2000s after the introduction of the VPS. When
employees were asked if there had been any increase in tensions and conflicts within
the IBOA between 2004 and 2007 only 13 per cent of respondents believed there had been.
The one voiced criticism referred to the perceived option of being free or not to participate in
the VPS. Only a small number of staff declined to participate but, of those, many complained
that they had been subsequently pressured to join and had received little support from the
union. The option of being permitted to opt-in or opt-out was, in their view, merely a fig leaf.
Union influence. The role and influence of the IBOA in setting pay for managerial
staff was reduced in the 1980s following the introduction of the VPS. By contrast, it was
12
The purpose
of VPS and
trade unions
enhanced with the introduction of VPS for the other categories of staff in the mid-2000s.
Before VPS’ introduction in 2006, pay bargaining was predominantly of a ritualistic
form. Pay increases were a “gift” of the social partnership process; they were
transposed to workplace level with little if any opportunity for additional bargaining.
With the introduction of the profit-sharing scheme, the IBOA was in a position to
negotiate the size of the “overall pot” for distribution to staff. In addition, it expanded
its representative role by dealing with employees’ grievances in the new appeal system
which accompanied the introduction of VPS.
Union members’ perceptions of union effectiveness. We found a mixture of views
amongst union members in our survey as to the effectiveness of the union following the
introduction of VPS. The predominant view was that the IBOA had been an effective union
and had increased its influence through the late 2000s.We asked unionmembers “how good
has the IBOA been in representing your interests over the last three years?”The stated time
period was designed to capture the period since the introduction of the VPS. While a small
minority believed the union had either been “very bad” or “fairly bad” (13 per cent), the
majority (55 per cent) perceived the union as either being “fairly good” or “very good”.
Union members’ orientation and commitment to the union. The results in respect of
members’ orientation to membership leaned in a positive direction. In total, 42 per cent
agreed that being a union member had becomemore important to them over the previous
three years. The level of union members’ commitment to the IBOA was also relatively
high (see Table I). We use a version of Gordon et al.’s (1980) scale to measure union
loyalty, responsibility to the union, willingness to work for the union and belief in
unionism. A shorter version of this scale had been used previously in a national
representative survey carried out by Geary (2008) of workforces in companies with
similar partnership arrangements in Ireland. This allows us to compare (on a selected
number of items) employees’ levels of union commitment in BankCo with that of Geary’s
sample. The mean score for each of the four items measured reveal that the level of
members’ commitment to the IBOA in BankCo was considerably higher than that found
by Geary (2008), and notwithstanding the limitations of cross-sectional data, would thus
suggest that the introduction of VPS had not damaged members’ loyalty to their union.
Further, the sub-scale mean values as well as the overall composite result reveal
moderately high levels of union commitment amongst union members in BankCo.
The effects of the market function of VPS on the IBOA in the mid-late 2000s
We investigate the impact of the manner of introduction and implementation and the
perceived outcomes for employees on members’ commitment to the IBOA in the first two
years after the introduction of the VPS in the mid-late 2000s. It should be noted that at this
point, it was designed primarily to serve amarket function. First, the evidence indicates that
the adoption of a joint management-union approach helped to engender confidence among
the workforce in the VPS and, in turn, in the effectiveness of the union in representing their
interests. We asked respondents whether or not workers and union representatives were
“properly informed and consulted” about the VPS before it was implemented. In total, 78
per cent agreed they were. Employees’ main concerns were generally of fearing biased and
arbitrary judgements, personality clashes and the difficulty of measuring employees’
performance objectively. Despite these worries, 92 per cent of respondents indicated that
management had taken their concerns into account when introducing the VPS.
The data presented in Table II takes the analysis one step further by enquiring whether the
IBOA was damaged or prospered in terms of workers’ commitment, arising from (A) the
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manner in which the VPS were introduced (two items are used: members’ familiarity with
the VPS and whether their concerns were addressed prior to the introduction of the VPS);
(B) whether the outcomes were of benefit to members (again two items are used: had
members believed they had benefited from VPS introduction and did they believe they
Mean SD
Loyalty
I feel a sense of pride at being part of the union 3.41 (2.25) 0.876
The record of my union is a good example of what dedicated people can get done 3.47 (2.25) 0.927
There is a lot to be gained from joining the union 3.64 (2.14) 0.92
Sub-scale mean 3.51 0.91
Belief in unionism
My values and the union’s values are very similar 3.44 0.828
My loyalty is to my work and not to my uniona 2.89 0.911
I could work just as well in another organisation where there was no union, as long
as the type of work was similara 3.28 (2.61) 1.037
Sub-scale mean 3.20 0.93
Willingness to work for union
I am willing to put a great deal of effort in beyond that normally expected of me in
order to make the union successful 2.93 0.836
If asked, I would serve on a committee for the union 2.57 1.065
Sub-scale mean 2.93 0.98
Responsibility to union
Every union member must be prepared to take the time and risk of lodging a
grievance 3.73 0.808
It is every member’s duty to support or help another worker with his or her
grievances 3.76 0.801
Sub-scale mean 3.75 0.80
Notes: aItems are reverse coded. A ten-item scale, each item scored 1¼ strongly disagree to
5¼ strongly agree. The mean values for Geary’s (2008) study are provided in parentheses. Cronbach’s
α¼ 0.809. Composite scale mean¼ 33.1, SD¼ 5.48
Table I.
Union commitment
β t-Value
(A) Manner of introduction of VPS
Familiarity with variable pay scheme (VPS) 0.091 2.29*
Workers’ concerns addressed in VPS agreement −0.029 −0.648
(B) Outcomes for members
How beneficial is VPS for employees? 0.003 0.074
I am well paid for the work I do 0.038 −0.899
(C) Trade union effectiveness
How good was the IBOA in representing workers’ interests in last 3 years? 0.552 14.047***
Notes: n (weighted)¼ 514. Adjusted R2¼ 0.361***. The dependent variable is union members’
commitment to the union. Control variables used in the model are: quality of relations between staff
and management, quality of relations among staff, preference for a cooperative union bargaining
posture, age, level of satisfaction with pay and occupational category. Only two of these control
variables have a significant effect, preference for a cooperative union bargaining posture and age.
*,**,***Statistically significant at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 level, respectively
Table II.
VPS and employees’
commitment to the
union: OLS
regression results
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were paid well for the work they undertook); and (C) whether the union had been effective
in representing members’ interests in the last three years. We added the overall
effectiveness of the union as a control variable, as many studies indicate that VPS is less
likely to undermine unions if the union is strong (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2011; Heery,
1997b). The items in equation (A) are designed to see if there is any link between members’
union commitment and the union’s early postures in relation to the introduction of the VPS;
that is, their efforts to ensure that their members were informed of their introduction and
purpose, and any concerns they may have had were addressed by management. Items
in (B) relate more directly to outcomes following the introduction of the VPS and the item in
(C) refers to the union’s continuing role and perceived level of effectiveness. Thus the items
in (B) and (C) are designed to capture the extent to which there might be a link between
union members’ perceptions of the downstream effects of VPS’s introduction and, in turn,
Q1 their levels of union commitment. Again, it should be held in mind that the data originates
from the employee survey which was conducted in the first two years of theQ2 introduction of
the VPS and at a time when Ireland’s economic boom was beginning to ebb and VPS
served primarily a market function.
The results for one of the items in (A) – employees’ familiarity with the VPS – is
significant, while the results for the other item – whether their concerns were addressed
prior to the introduction of VPS – as well as both items in (B) are non-significant and
thus explain little of the variance in union commitment. However, the major influence
would appear to be the effectiveness of the IBOA in representing workers’ interests in
the period following the introduction of the VPS. It would seem then that one important
reason why the IBOA had been able to retain the regard and commitment of its
membership was because of its early strategies in relation to the design of VPS and
its continuing role in representing members’ interests.
In summary, we conclude that the downstream consequences of VPS on the IBOA
were largely benign when the VPS was used to serve primarily a market function:
union membership and density had been maintained, the union had remained a
cohesive and effective voice for employees, employees were happy with the manner in
which the VPS had been implemented, and they remained committed to their union.
Discussion and conclusion
There has been considerable debate in the literature concerning the compatibility of
VPS and trade unions (Gunnigle et al., 1998; Heery, 1997b). Recent empirical
contributions reveal mixed outcomes for unions (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2011;
Nergaard and Dolvik, 2012). This paper contributes to this literature by examining
the downstream consequences for a well-established trade union when the purpose of
the VPS shifted from serving a market function to a managerial function in one of
Ireland’s largest financial institutions. The overall findings confirmed the a priori
expectation that the managerial function of VPS is more likely to damage unions than
the market function (Flanders, 1970), while it adds that shifts in the interplay between
market and managerial functions of VPS across time and within the organisation play
an important part in explaining the mixed outcomes for unions.
This paper adds to the existing literature in four ways. First, there is a need to revisit
Flanders’ typology which was used by him in a descriptive manner and was not
developed with any great theoretical rigour or subsequently with any detailed
empirical inquiry. We find that the ostensible market function of VPS as deployed by
management in BankCo served not only to attract, retain and motivate suitably
qualified employees, but it was also designed to reduce labour costs in a context of
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increased market competition. This dual purpose was not anticipated by Flanders.
His typology distinguishes essentially between managerial objectives which hinge on a
clear distinction between employee “motivation” and “control”, but these two are not
dichotomous. Both came to be embraced within the one aim or function in BankCo’s use
of VPS, both as introduced in the 1980s and 2000s. Staff welcomed their introduction,
voted for their introduction and in one case relinquished union representation for it
(branch management). With their introduction managerial control over the labour
process was enhanced. At this point in time and in times of economic prosperity the two
aims (motivation and control) came to complement one another. However, as the
economic climate worsened the two objectives came to be in conflict with one another.
Second, the research evidence points to the critical role played by outlet (line)
management in the operation of VPS and, in turn, on VPS’ consequences for trade
unions. As the economic crisis took hold in 2008, management’s strategy shifted to
using the VPS to extend the managerial function of pay, to extend management’s
control over the labour process and to reduce labour costs. At this point, the effects of
the revised VPS became potentially more negative for staff and, to an extent, for the
union. However, where local management used their autonomy to moderate the harsher
elements of the scheme, employees had few grievances, but where local management
opted to emphasise the harsher functions of the VPS the effects were more adverse for
employees. Thus, the disposition of line management towards the use of VPS critically
accounts for the mixed effect of VPS on employees and trade unions. The key task in
any future research which explores the role of line management, particularly across
different business units, is to explain why such variable dispositions arise.
Third, this paper contributes to a better understanding of how trade unions come to
adopt different postures in regard to VPS. In the mid to late 2000 the union had adopted a
pragmatic position: while it saw the potential risks, it could foresee that these could be
managed or outweighed by potential benefits, which their members were anxious to avail
of. However, the union’s position was not so accommodating in the 1980s. Their conflictual
posture resulted in being marginalised and management moving unilaterally to introduce
the VPS for senior outlet management. This previous experience of the union fighting
unsuccessfully against the adoption of VPS had a substantial influence on the union
acceptance of VPS in the 2000s. Thus, this study contributes to a better understanding of
the reasons why a union’s position might change and how they might come to accept VPS
(Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2011; Marginson et al., 2008; Heery, 1997a).
Finally, this paper has some practical lessons for managers, unions and workers.
Although, in many respects, the context for the adoption of VPS in the mid-2000s in
BankCo could be considered a best case scenario in terms of the forms and purposes of
VPS (paid on top of existing wages), the process of introduction and implementation
(i.e. joint decision making, voluntary scheme and an appeal system), and their positive
outcomes, this study draws attention to the challenges faced by all stakeholders
regarding the adoption and implementation of VPS, especially as economic
circumstances change. It also highlights the central role of line management and the
part they play in implementing VPS. Where they are found to act in an inconsistent
manner, various anomalies in the operation of VPS are likely to arise. These in turn are
likely to give rise to negative consequences for employees and the company, such as
diminished employees’ loyalty and commitment to the organisation (Kessler, 2000). The
increase in responsibilities asked of middle managers requires that they be afforded
adequate training to deal with VPS and that, in addition, senior management conduct
regular oversight regarding VPS implementation.
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While this study goes noticeably further than much of the existing literature in the
depth with which we have been able to examine the effects of VPS purpose on trade
unions, the consequences of the shift to a managerial function of VPS since the 2008 crisis
can only be assessed in a preliminary manner. Further research is required to see
whether over the period of a prolonged economic crisis unions might be able to moderate
the harsher elements of VPS as well as being able to sustain their presence, influence and
regard among their membership. Our findings suggest that any potentially adverse
effects on employees and unions are likely to be moderated by the overall management
purpose of VPS and the manner of their implementation by line management, as they
grapple with the contradictions underpinning managerial strategies in balancing the
requirement to control and motivate staff and which are not neatly distinguished from
one another whatever function – be it “market” or “managerial” as prescribed for in VPS.
Note
1. An additional interview was conducted with the IBOA’s General Secretary in 2011.
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